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ist, remote possibilities of reverter become a necessity." But why? Conceding the possibility of executory devises or of contingent uses does not compel the concession of the possibility of valid remote devises or uses. Why then may not there be good and also bad possibilities of reverter? The Appendix, p. 556, presents an additional discussion of this interesting topic.

While expressing strong dissatisfaction with the decisions, Professor Gray concedes (p. 27 et seq.) that conditions subsequent are not subject to the rule against perpetuities.

It would be improper to close this review without directing special attention to Appendix F, on Future Estates in Personal Property, an able and luminous discussion.

CONDITIONAL AND FUTURE INTERESTS AND ILLEGAL CONDITIONS AND RESTRAINTS. By A. M. Kales. Chicago: Callaghan & Co. 1905. pp. xlv, 453.

The new legal periodical, of which the author of this work is an editor, the *Illinois Law Review*, has in its first issue reviewed the book under consideration with so much judgment and discrimination as to leave little for other reviewers to say. The work is certainly a most praiseworthy effort to state the law of a single but important jurisdiction on a topic or group of related topics bristling with difficulties. This effort has in the main been entirely successful. The Illinois cases have been examined with painstaking care and have been subjected to a rigorous and searching analysis.

The faults of the book—an excess of theory and elementary exposition, a too close adherence to the methods, the arrangement and the opinions of the learned writer and teacher to whom the book is dedicated and a too obvious effort to sustain the Illinois decisions and bring them into harmony with the teachings of Prof. Gray—are, after all, faults that lean to virtue's side. It is not for us to say that the bench and bar of the jurisdiction to which the work is devoted may not stand in need of just such a restatement of elementary and orthodox doctrine in a field in which heresy is so easy and so serious in its consequences.

Something must be said of the plan—of which the work under review and the new legal journal above referred to are the latest and perhaps the best exponents—of writing law books and publishing journals devoted to the law of a single American jurisdiction. Notwithstanding the danger which this plan may involve of promoting a separate tendency and of making the law of each State sufficient unto itself, it has much to commend it. While the plan of the usual law treatise, of treating the law of the United States as a single body of jurisprudence, has the great advantage of tending to create the condition of affairs assumed by it to exist, or at least to keep alive the sense of an essential and underlying unity, it certainly results in most cases in building up a legal system which has no real existence anywhere outside the writer's consciousness. The local treatise, on the other hand, may, without sacrificing the historical background or ignoring the light that comes from related jurisdictions, present a fairly complete picture of the local law, of its tendency and of the influences that are shaping it, and thus render a service to the bench

and bar which can rarely be afforded by the general treatise. Professor Kales' book is not without interest and value to the lawyer and law student of every common law jurisdiction; to the Illinois lawyer, it is invaluable.

A TREATISE ON AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP. By John S. Wise, of the New York Bar. Edward Thompson Company, Northport, Long Island, N. Y. 1906. pp. vii, 340.

The object of this work, as stated by the author in his preface, is to supply the basis for special lectures on American citizenship in our law schools, and a convenient key for references to the active members of the legal profession. It is a subject which he has had unusual occasion to study, and many of the questions embraced in it he has argued at the bar. The style is clear and energetic, and the discussion is always interesting. Since the war with Spain, the question of citizenship has assumed new phases, and these are embraced in the volume before us. As to the fundamental question of what constitutes citizenship of the United States—a question as to which eminent authorities differ—we are not sure that we can agree with the author's views on all points, though he may be able to give a reason for the faith that is in him. For instance, he seems to hold (pp. 51-52) that citizenship of the United States "by birth" is restricted to persons who are, in the phrase of the XIVth Amendment, "born in the United States." We say "seems," because, while he does not in terms say so, he places in the category of citizens "by naturalization" (pp. 53, 60, 61) the foreign-born children of American fathers. And yet, in referring to the case of Mayor McClellan, who happened first to see the light in Dresden, Saxony, the author declares that "he is as much a citizen of the United States" as if he had been born in New Jersey, of which State his father was at the time a citizen. The author himself is in a similar situation, as he was born at Rio de Janeiro, while his father was American minister there. But, if it be true that they are citizens only by naturalization, they are subject to a disability from which some millions of their natural-born fellow-citizens are exempt, namely, they can never aspire to the Presidency. For our own part, we do not hesitate to admit that we do not think they are subject to any such disability, it being our opinion that the provision of the XIVth Amendment is not exclusive, and that at least a person in the predicament of Mayor McClellan, who was born after the act of 1855, is by force of the statute a natural-born citizen.

The volume includes a chapter on expatriation and alienage, but the discussion of these topics is meager; and the statement that the "doctrine of expatriation" had been "steadily advocated by the American people from the foundation of their government" must be taken with substantial limitations. Section 1999 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, embodying the provisions of the act of 1868, certainly cannot be accepted (p. 263) as the exposition of a consistent American view.

We are not disposed to hold an author, especially where he is also a busy practitioner, responsible for errors in proof, of which we have noticed several without searching for them. In line 7, page 93, the phrase "that it is doubtful" obviously should read "but it is doubtful."